Introduction: The influence of financial ties to pharmaceutical companies remains controversial. We assessed a potential relationship between pharmaceutical payments and prescription patterns for degarelix and denosumab.
Financial ties between pharmaceuticals and physician prescribers have long been scrutinized in the medical literature. 1e3 While limiting criminal behavior has historically been a focus of regulators, raising awareness of potential conflicts of interest has only recently entered the jurisdiction of the United States government. Whether biases exist in prescriber patterns is a matter of ongoing debate with varying opinions on the appropriateness of prescriber-pharmaceutical interactions. 4e6 However, the lack of large-scale national databases on prescriber patterns and pharmaceutical payments have limited formal study design. In April 2014 CMS released 10 million billing records of a total of 880,000 health care providers, accounting for more than $77 billion in Medicare funds distributed in 2012. CMS later released payment data from drug manufacturers with 68,000 payment records amounting to more than $3.7 billion. To our knowledge they are the largest national databases on physician reimbursements and pharmaceutical payments to date.
Heavily marketed drugs may be particularly susceptible to prescriber bias. Two examples are degarelix and denosumab, which are 2 new treatments for prostate cancer. Degarelix, a GnRH (gonadotropin-releasing hormone) antagonist manufactured by Ferring Pharmaceuticals (Parsippany, New Jersey), was FDA approved in 2008 for the treatment of advanced prostate cancer. 7 Denosumab, a RANK-L (receptor activator of nuclear factor k-B ligand) inhibitor manufactured by AmgenÒ, was FDA approved in 2011 for bone loss in patients with prostate cancer undergoing hormone ablation for metastatic prostate cancer. 8 Disclosures of advertising spending for these 2 drugs are limited as Ferring Pharmaceuticals is a private company and Amgen provides figures on a consolidated basis. However, in the case of denosumab, since obtaining FDA approval, sales have increased at a compounded rate of 60% per year from $554 million to $2.25 billion. 9, 10 Whether prescriber adoption is influenced by payments from pharmaceuticals is unclear. A combination of the 2 CMS databases enables the opportunity of a focused study of these 2 drugs. We sought to identify whether there is an association between pharmaceutical payments and prescription patterns of degarelix and denosumab in the CMS databases. Medicare B prescribers were stratified according to whether or not they received Open Payments (Physician Payments Sunshine Act) payments as a basis for comparison.
Materials and Methods

Data and Study Population
We used the 2012 Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data: Physician and Other Supplier PUF (Medicare B) database files provided by CMS to identify all urologists and oncologists who prescribed degarelix and denosumab. 11 Medicare B contains more than 10 million records of prescriber reimbursement data extracted from NCH (National Claims History) SAFs (Standard Analytic Files), including information on services and procedures provided to Medicare beneficiaries by physicians and other health care professionals. Data include physician national provider identifier, name, address, city, state, HCPCS (Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System) code, specialty, service count, beneficiary per day service count (adjusted beneficiary count), and billing and reimbursement amounts. Each line item represents a separate physician billing data for each drug. The database contains fee-for-service data and does not include indications for listed services or procedures.
Prescribing urologists and oncologists were extracted from the database. These prescribers were linked by name and address with the second half of the 2013 CMS Open Payments database to determine whether they received payments from Ferring Pharmaceuticals or Amgen. 12 The
Sunshine Act database contains payment data, including physician name, address, city, state, specialty, manufacturer name and identifiers, payment amounts and payment characteristics such as the date and form of payment. Each line item represents a single payment to a physician.
Variables
HCPCS codes J9155 and J0897 were used to identify instances of degarelix and denosumab injections, respectively, in the Medicare B data set. Specialty, service count, beneficiary per day service count (adjusted beneficiary count) and average payment per service were listed for each prescribing provider. Service count represents a standardized Medicare defined billing unit. The adjusted beneficiary count represents the number of doses prescribed by each provider. The primary outcome (total Medicare reimbursement) was calculated by multiplying the average payment per service by the total service count. Prescribers were linked to the Sunshine Act database by first and last name.
In the event of duplicate name entries matching was performed using the prescriber state, city and address. Sunshine Act payments were calculated by summing all listed reimbursements.
Statistical Analysis
For each drug we compared prescriber specialty, adjusted beneficiary count and total Medicare reimbursement between prescribers who did and did not receive Sunshine payments. The Wilcoxon rank sum test and the chi-square test were used for continuous and categorical variables, respectively. Specialty comparison could not be performed between groups for degarelix because no oncology prescribers received Sunshine payments. The median Sunshine payment was calculated for each drug. The Spearman rank correlation was used to assess the relationship between total Sunshine payments and total Medicare reimbursement for each drug.
For denosumab the association between receipt of Sunshine payment and total Medicare reimbursement was assessed by median regression. The estimated regression coefficient describes the predicted median difference in Medicare reimbursement between groups. Prescriber specialty was included in the adjusted model. A test for interaction was performed to identify whether the association between receipt of Sunshine payment and total Medicare reimbursement differed between urologists and oncologists. Adjusted analyses were not performed for degarelix because no oncology prescribers received Sunshine payment.
All analyses were performed using StataÒ, version 14. This study used public databases and was institutional review board exempt.
Results
Of the 160 prescribers of degarelix and 1,507 prescribers of denosumab 91 (57%) and 854 (57%), respectively, received Sunshine payment. Table 1 shows study population characteristics. No oncology prescribers of degarelix received Sunshine payment. For denosumab oncologists were more likely than urologists to have received Sunshine payment (58% vs 46%, p ¼ 0.002). For degarelix the prescribers who received Sunshine payment had a higher median total Medicare reimbursement ($13,257 vs $9,554, p ¼ 0.01). For denosumab the prescribers who received Sunshine payment had a higher median adjusted beneficiary count (55 vs 50, p <0.001) and higher median total Medicare reimbursement ($69,620 vs $60,732, p <0.001).
To degarelix prescribers who received Sunshine payment(s) the median total Sunshine payment amount was $28.15 (IQR 16.25e61.96). There was no correlation between total Sunshine payment amount and total Medicare reimbursement (r ¼ e0.07, p ¼ 0.51, see figure) . To denosumab prescribers who received Sunshine payment(s) the median total Sunshine payment amount was $47.13 (IQR 21.08e107.16). There was a correlation between total Sunshine payment amount and total Medicare reimbursement (r ¼ 0.10, p ¼ 0.003). Table 2 shows univariable and multivariable analyses of predictors of total Medicare reimbursement for denosumab. On multivariable analysis receipt of Sunshine payment (adjusted median difference $5,844, 95% CI 937e10,749) and oncology specialty (adjusted median difference $34,380, 95% CI 26,715e42,045) were independently associated with total Medicare reimbursement. The interaction between receipt of Sunshine payment and prescriber specialty was not associated with total Medicare payment (p ¼ 0.25).
Discussion
To our knowledge this study is the first to use the Medicare reimbursements and Sunshine Act databases to study the association between industry payments and prescriber patterns. We found a modest difference in physician total Medicare reimbursement between those who did and did not receive Sunshine Act payments for degarelix and denosumab. This is despite the fact that most total Sunshine payments to prescribers were less than $50. In the case of denosumab there was a weak correlation between total Sunshine payment and total Medicare reimbursement. Furthermore, the association between receipt of Sunshine payment and Medicare reimbursement of denosumab remained after adjusting for type of specialty.
Conflicts of interest in medicine have been studied extensively. There is much literature to suggest a positive association between pharmaceutical interaction and professional behavior.
1e3,13 This is in contrast to prescriber perceptions as there is an apparent association between the number of attended drug lunches and the belief that discussions with pharmaceutical representatives had no effect on prescription behavior. 14 Chren and Landefeld reported that physicians who received money to attend or speak at symposia, or perform research were more likely to request that a drug be added to a hospital formulary (OR 5.7). 1 Likewise, a multi-institutional study at 7 Midwest teaching hospitals revealed that brief conversations with pharmaceutical representatives and honoraria or research support were predictors of drug addition requests to a hospital formulary. 15 Those investigators noted that 25% of faculty and 32% of residents changed practices at least once based on pharmaceutical representative contact. Despite being well reported in the literature, historical study methodology has been limited by the lack of objective measurements and a reliance on survey data, which is subject to recall bias. Furthermore, the scarcity of negative studies in this field may include a component of publication bias. 16 In contrast to prior studies, our study has the advantage of using quantitative payment data and it is not as susceptible to recall bias. Whether the magnitude of payment affects prescriber behavior is an area of ongoing investigation. In a national survey published in 2007, 94% of physicians reported a relationship with the pharmaceutical industry. 3 The majority of interactions were in the form of food or drug samples, which is likely the case in our cohort, given the modest median payments received. One would expect a higher degree of influence on prescriber patterns at the high end of the distribution. Our study produced mixed results in this regard as we identified a relationship between total Medicare reimbursement and total Sunshine payments for denosumab but not for degarelix. Still, even among prescribers of denosumab the magnitude of the association was weak (r ¼ 0.10) and may not be as important as once perceived. The observations in this study pose an important question for pharmaceutical companies. If the correlation between the magnitude of payment and prescriber behavior is weak, what is the return on investment? It is possible that the investment has indirect effects on the prescriber community as a whole. That is, increased adoption by those who receive Sunshine payments would result in increased adoption by those who do not receive payments. Funding events geared toward prescribers could result in increasing general awareness of the drug, first directly through participants and thereafter indirectly through education, discussion and collaboration. Our study was designed to detect a difference between recipients and nonrecipients of Sunshine payments, and not to detect indirect effects on the community as a whole. Specifically, we did not measure the relative attractiveness of denosumab and degarelix against peer drugs to gauge the market share of prescriber behavior. The limited scope of our study precludes any suggestion that professional societies should modify policies. 2,17e19 There is a general lack of awareness regarding the potential for conflict of interest 20e22 and guidelines have served an important role in informing health care professionals. 20 Instead, this study highlights the importance of quantifiable metrics as a basis for conclusions. Recall bias is a well documented limitation in survey data. 23 Although entries in the CMS database may include an element of recall bias, the effect is likely less than in surveys. In contrast to physician recollection, payments can be immediately quantified and corroborated by transaction data. Thus, our study defines an effective alternative to surveys and should serve as a basis for subsequent studies in conflict of interest. Our report should be considered in in the context of several limitations. 1) The Medicare B database contains data on 2012 and the Sunshine Act database contains data on the second half of 2013. If the effects of Sunshine payments on Medicare reimbursements are temporally dependent, our study would need concurrent databases for analysis. However, it is unlikely that the small time difference between the 2 databases would significantly affect prescriber behavior.
2) Because our conclusions are confined to denosumab and degarelix, generalizability is limited. It is possible that there are differential effects of Sunshine payments on prescription patterns for other classes of drugs. However, denosumab and degarelix are 2 commonly prescribed drugs with favorable reimbursement that are heavily marketed to urologists and oncologists. At the outset of this study we thought that these drugs were appropriate candidates to test whether prescribers of these drugs may be influenced by industry payments.
3) CMS has jurisdiction over only federally sponsored programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. Prescription and payment data outside the CMS jurisdiction would not be reported. The quality of the Medicare B database as a basis for drawing conclusions on general practices has been criticized in prior literature. 24, 25 Since indications for prescriptions are not listed, it is impossible to determine the quality of care delivered based on billing data alone. We cannot conclude that lower billing amounts equate to better care. 4) Sunshine Act data are reported by the manufacturer rather than the recipient and these data can contain inaccuracies. Listed recipients have the option of contesting entries but lack of awareness may cause errors to persist.
Nevertheless, despite these limitations, the CMS is the largest payer of health care in the United States, covering more than 90 million Americans. 26 This makes the Medicare B and Sunshine Act databases 2 of the most robust databases available.
Conclusions
Recipients of payments from industry contained in the Sunshine Act database tend to receive more total Medicare reimbursements with regard to degarelix and denosumab. Whether the magnitude of Sunshine payment correlates with prescriber behavior continues to be controversial. This is a subject of ongoing study.
conceivable that a physician who attended a sponsored dinner, for example, has a more urban practice and simply treats more patients than one who did not. Interpretation of the results is further limited by the choice of control group. There is no information on physicians who did not prescribe degarelix or denosumab, or on those prescribing competitor agents. It would be valuable to present, for example, full data on payments from Amgen and NovartisÒ in association with Medicare data for physicians prescribing denosumab, zoledronic acid, both drugs or neither drug.
Disclosure of financial conflicts of interest is obviously consistent with ethical practices in clinical and research settings. However, the contemporary era is marked by multiply duplicative disclosure paperwork requirements that in aggregate impose nontrivial time costs. The Sunshine Act has resulted in the dissemination of large amounts of nonvalidated data with no annotations regarding reasons for payments at an estimated cost of $269 million for the first year of reporting alone 1 and with unclear concrete benefits.
Future studies must ascertain whether the act will actually drive improved physician behavior, health care savings or greater public trust. 
